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Feature
Core Cities’ strong growth in
the 2010s: Were they ‘leaving







Second-order cities are generally seen as disadvantaged places in the literature on globalisation,
but in recent years they have staged a revival in several countries. This article uses two data
sources to examine the employment change recorded by Britain’s Core Cities between 2012 and
2017, breaking it down by type of worker, occupation and industry. It aims, firstly, to
identify which elements of their growth are distinctive compared to the country as a whole
and, secondly, to see how far their growth has been emulated by the areas around them
that contain the majority of Britain’s ‘left-behind’ places. The article demonstrates the
great strides made by the nine provincial cities combined, substantially exceeding the
national rate of increase for male, female, full-time, part-time, employee and self-employed
work, notably in the three highest status occupational groups and in all industrial sectors apart
from manufacturing and transport, especially business services. It is also found that their growth
outstripped that of their local, regional and EU comparators, underlining the importance of
direct policy intervention for ‘left-behind’ places rather than relying on ‘trickle-down’ processes,
especially given uncertainties about the sustainability of Core City growth in the wake of COVID-
19 and Brexit.
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In many countries second-order cities
tended to rebound in the 2010s after many
years of trailing their premier cities. This
was certainly the case in Britain with its
main regional centres recording a substan-
tial economic upturn from around 2012
after a decade of relatively lacklustre per-
formance. Moreover, according to com-
mentators like The Economist (2013), it
was a ‘growth spurt’ that ‘left behind’
many places in the rest of their regions
(rather than leading to trickle-down effects
for them), causing greater intra-regional
inequality and prompting a political back-
lash including support for Brexit and pleas
for a less city-centric policy stance (Martin
et al., 2016; Pike, 2018).
Second-order cities are generally seen as
relatively disadvantaged places in the liter-
ature on globalisation and the associated
triumph of the ‘world cities’ that have
benefited most from the rise of what
Gottmann (1961) termed the ‘quaternary
sector’ in his ground-breaking study of
Megalopolis on the north-eastern seaboard
of the USA. They are seen to lack the crit-
ical mass of human capital and other
agglomeration economies to be found in
the likes of London, New York and
Tokyo. As a result, they have tended to
miss out on the phenomenal growth that
has been occurring in finance, banking,
insurance, auditing, legal services and
other transactional activities that rely on
the dense networks and opportunities for
face-to-face contact offered by the largest
urban concentrations.
The possibilities for a resurgence of
second-order cities at least in the pre-
pandemic era should have come as no sur-
prise to those who have been studying the
impact of new forms of communication on
both working practices and social behav-
iour. Indeed, there has been statistical evi-
dence that such a revival of their growth
fortunes has already been underway.
Census data on some of the Britain’s
regional cities revealed considerable
growth between 2001 and 2011, building
on the revival of city-centre populations in
1991–2001 (Nathan and Urwin, 2006; Rae,
2013). Eurostat data for the 2010s suggests
that employment growth of the largest
second-order EU27 city regions has on
average been exceeding the overall EU
rate, especially in the key sectors of profes-
sional, financial and business services.
What is newer is the coining of the
phrase ‘left-behind’ applied to towns argu-
ably overshadowed by the growth of pro-
vincial cities, together with a related real
contrast in people’s felt experience,
expressed in a marked divergence in
voting behaviour between the metropolitan
and other areas of developed countries (see,
for example Guilluy, 2019, with regard to
France). For a considerable time, the stan-
dard London-based view was that the best
prospect for such towns was for their incor-
poration, primarily through improved
transport links, in city regions strengthened
by forces of agglomeration and ‘trickle-
down’ (Swinney et al., 2018). Many of the
opportunities taken up by the English
Regional Development Agencies lay in
city projects such as concert halls or water-
side offices and flats. The more recently
emergent view that there is a strong
‘towns versus cities’ issue is still refuted by
Centre for Cities and Core Cities Group
(2018), the UK 2070 project (UK2070,
2020) and Carter (2018), following
McCann (2016) writing that the UK pros-
perity gap (measured in terms of GVA per
worker) between large cities, small cities,
towns and villages was very small.
Even before voting in the 2016 Brexit
referendum (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018) and
the 2017 general election (Jennings et al.,
2017), however, analysis by Martin et al.
(2016) showed that there was a very signif-
icant disjuncture between the growing
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prosperity of cities and their hinterlands
and that a policy focus on cities with new
combined authorities was inequitable.
Economic analyses (e.g. by Beatty and
Fothergill, 2019) showed the narrowness
of the economy of post-industrial areas,
notably their dependence on call centres
and distribution depots. In recognising the
situation, academics argued for a ‘less cen-
tred’ spatial policy structure (Martin et al.,
2019; Pike, 2018), and considered possible
development policies for ‘left behind towns’
(Industrial Communities Alliance, 2020;
Maclennan and McCauley, 2018;
Tomaney and Pike, 2018). Politically, Lisa
Nandy, significantly the MP for Wigan,
founded the ‘Centre for Towns’, and the
Conservative governments played on the
plight of targetable Labour constituencies
(often post-industrial towns) in the 2019
election and established the Stronger
Towns Fund (Ministry of Housing,
Communities and Local Government
Towns Fund prospectus, 2019) across a sur-
prising number of English towns, defined at
a sub-local-authority level.
This article aims to serve two purposes.
The first is to explore the recent experience
of Britain’s second-order cities in greater
depth and discuss its significance, building
on previous work that has tracked their
economies through the three main recession
and recovery periods between the late 1970s
and 2012. Secondly, it makes formal com-
parison of these cities with their surround-
ing towns, both those located within their
‘metropolitan rings’ and those situated fur-
ther afield in their wider regions. A detailed
dissection of two kinds of employment
record is used to find the principal ingre-
dients of the cities’ differential growth in
terms of the mixes of skills and industrial
sectors involved. These analyses provide a
platform for the better understanding of
how sustainable this new-found growth of
the second-order city-region cores is likely
to be. This is a key issue both in the context
of the ‘levelling-up’ policy agenda concern-
ing the divide between London and the rest
of the country, and also in relation to the
Core Cities Group’s claim that a policy of
concentrating public investment on their
cities remains the most effective way of
regenerating their wider regions through a
‘trickle-down’ process. It also provides a
basis for assessing how the major fall-out
from the imposition of the COVID-19 lock-
down from March 2020 may alter the geog-
raphy of economic prospects in these two
fundamental policy arenas.
Economic context
There is growing concern about the so-called
‘left-behind places’ (LBP) across Europe and
North America, both in the political arena
and in academic circles, associated with
issues about their contribution to (or drain
on) national economies, about increasing
inequalities of deprivation and life chances
between places and about a political back-
lash including anti-establishment voting
behaviour (as for Donald Trump in the
2016 US Presidential Election and for
Boris Johnson in the 2019 UK General
Election). In the UK case, the roots of the
disaffection of the LBP can be traced back
nearly a century, as they were prominent
among the places suffering from the shrink-
age of demand for the products of mining
and heavy industry immediately after the
First World War and especially in the
Great Depression years following the Wall
Street Crash in 1929. Being accompanied by
the growth of light engineering and services
in London and the south of England more
widely, this engendered a ‘North-South drift’
in population that mushroomed in the 1950s
and 1960s and led to the designation of areas
for regional-policy support. These areas
became particularly extensive in the late
1970s, blanketing most of northern and
western Britain including the far South
West and reaching into the West Midlands
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in the 1980s following the phase of most
rapid deindustrialisation (Townsend, 1983).
Even then, however, it was recognised
that the North-South divide – which was
being represented as a line running approx-
imately from the Bristol Channel to the
Humber estuary (see, for example,
Champion et al., 1987: 13, Figure 1.4) –
was not separating two entirely homoge-
neous halves of the country. In their
Booming Towns (BT) report, Champion
and Green (1985) revealed that, while the
southern half of the country accounted for
the vast majority of the places scoring
highly on the BT Index, it also contained
several places that were classified in the
lower half of the rankings, mainly around
its coastline but also including London at
this time. Similarly, a fair number of places
north of the line featured in the top half of
the rankings, though these were mainly
based on smaller centres and reflected a
sharp rural–urban contrast here then – a
point echoed by a study entitled ‘The
Northern Lights’ (Breheny et al., 1987; see
also Champion and Townsend, 1990).
Three decades on, the current picture
reflects both continuity and change com-
pared to then. The main element of conti-
nuity is the North-South divide, which if
anything appears to have become more
entrenched over time, not least due to the
dramatic turnaround in London’s fortunes
dating from the late 1980s and associated
primarily with the deregulation of the finan-
cial services sector in the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986.
This has resulted in a long-term widening of
the wealth gap between the two halves
of the country, as reflected in a wide range
of datasets including on household incomes
and worker productivity as documented
most comprehensively by McCann (2016).
In current writing about the slow growth of
UK productivity, concern is expressed that
output per head is lagging in both the
regions and their Core Cities (OECD,
2020). However, Beatty and Fothergill
(2019) asserted that a very large part of
the discrepancy can be attributed to the
effects of differential sectoral and occupa-
tional structures.
At the same time, London’s recovery
denotes a sea change from the urban-to-
rural shift that is well documented for the
1970s and 1980s to one where agglomera-
tion economies and other facets of global-
ising have preferenced the largest urban
concentrations in the world economy.
There is growing evidence that this tenden-
cy may also have been having a positive
effect on the trajectory of second-order
cities. In the UK, this would certainly
seem to be the case for some members of
the Core Cities Group that was established
in the mid 1990s in order to persuade cen-
tral government to channel more invest-
ment to these secondary agglomerations
on the assumption that in this changed
world these larger cities stood the best
chance of competing with London as well
– it was argued – as reviving the fortunes of
their wider hinterlands through trickle-
down effects. By the mid 2010s employment
in these cities was growing faster than the
national average, though their recovery to
2015, while marked, was slower than
London’s (Cambridge Econometrics, 2018).
This impressive development raises the
question as to whether the urban-to-rural
shift has become less marked or even
reversed in the regions in which these
cities are located. The literature on the
UK’s regional patterns of growth suggests
a fluctuating situation. An analysis covering
the long period 1984–2007 by Champion
and Townsend (2011) showed that, while
employment growth for England’s eight
Core Cities was generally lower than for
the rest of their city regions, it was higher
for one of their five periods, namely 1998–
2002. Recent research on the latest decade
by Beatty et al. (2019) shows that their
‘main regional cities’ matched the national
rate of growth in employee jobs for 2012–
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2017 – a finding that is broadly in line with
our initial analysis for the present article,
though when the self-employed and so-
called ‘flexible working’ (see below) are
included, then the Core Cities as a group
were growing faster than Great Britain as
a whole at this time. Beatty et al’s (2019)
study was focused primarily on the relative
performance of their ‘former coalfields’,
whereas here our purpose is to compare
the Core Cities with the whole of their
wider regions.
Aims and approach
Against this background, this article inves-
tigates two main areas of inquiry. One
relates to the Core Cities themselves –
both in aggregate and individually – and
seeks to establish the extent to which they
exceeded the national rate of growth in the
2010s and to discover what combination of
activities lies behind this superior perfor-
mance in terms of types of work, focusing
on occupational status and industrial
sector. The other area concerns the question
of how the growth of the Core Cities com-
pares with that of their immediate hinter-
lands and their wider surrounding regions.
There might conceivably be evidence of a
‘trickle-down effect’ but, if not, is this
because this process might occur only
after a time lag or is it because the strong
growth achieved by the Core Cities is not of
a type that would be expected to flourish in
the smaller cities, towns and rural areas
around them?
Our study focuses on the nine members
of the Core Cities that we have studied pre-
viously (Champion and Townsend, 2011,
2013; Townsend and Champion, 2014).
These comprise Birmingham, Bristol,
Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester,
Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield, i.e.
excluding the more recent joiners Cardiff
and Belfast as well as the capitals of
England and Scotland which are not
members. We define these on the basis of
their unitary local authority areas and com-
pare their performance with that of their
regions, the latter being split two ways
between their immediate hinterlands
(defined as the remainders of their former
metropolitan counties where relevant and
the equivalent NUTS3 areas for the
others) and the rest of their regions (where
region refers to the current statistical
regions of England and the rest of
Scotland for Glasgow).
In terms of our data on employment
change, as we are concerned primarily
with the economy of these places, we use
workplace-based counts, referring to
where the work is based rather than where
the workforce is living. We derive these
from two main sources, namely the
Annual Population Survey (APS) and
Business Register and Employment Survey
(BRES). The APS, which is an expanded
version of the Labour Force Survey, uses
a questionnaire which is administered to a
sample of households and collects informa-
tion on all types of paid work. BRES col-
lects data from employers about their
workforce, with full coverage of larger
firms together with estimates derived from
a sample of smaller firms, but omitting most
of those which have no employees. Our
focus is on change for the five-year period
2012–2017, but because both our sources
are based – entirely or in part – on sample
surveys that give less robust results for
finer-grained geographies, we use three
years’ worth of counts to give an average
for each of our specified years, i.e. 2011–
2013 for 2012 and 2016–2018 for 2017. It
is important to note that full-time students
are omitted from the APS’s sub-regional
data on employment and, while BRES
includes those with part-time jobs, its refer-
ence point is mid-September, i.e. before the
start of term for most universities. Further
details about these two sources and the
degree of confidence we place in them are
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given in the relevant sections of results that
follow.
Relative employment growth
This section addresses three main questions:
(1) How strongly have our set of Core Cities
been growing in terms of employment rela-
tive to the national average and does this
vary by type of worker? (2) How strongly
have they grown compared with their
immediate rings and their wider regions,
again by type of worker? (3) How much
do both these vary across the nine Core
Cities individually? As mentioned above,
our focus is on the five-year period 2012–
2017, though our data spans 2011–2018
because we have calculated employment
numbers for the start and end of the refer-
ence period using three-year averages
around those years to reduce the effect of
sampling error.
The answers to the first two questions
are provided in Figure 1, where the columns
represent the overall workplace-based
employment change rates for the five-year
period for the aggregate of the nine Core
Cities compared with those for their rings
and for the non-metropolitan remainders of
their regions and finally with the national
(Great Britain) rate. The first panel gives
the rates for total employment as defined
by the BRES, i.e. employees and those of
the self-employed that are registered for
VAT or PAYE, while the remaining seven
panels are derived from the APS and
include all self-employed people and also
flexible employment. Despite covering
somewhat different definitions of employ-
ment, nationally the BRES and APS indi-
cate very similar rates of total employment
growth (cf. the first two panels), but for the
Core Cities aggregate the APS gives a faster
growth rate than the BRES, which would
seem to be mainly due to their strong
growth in self-employment.
To set this growth of 338,800 jobs in its
APS labour market context, it has provided
no less than 10.2 net new jobs per 100 of the
resident working-age population of the
Core Cities at the start of the period, com-
pared with as few as 4.1 in the metropolitan
rings and 5.9 in Great Britain as a whole.
This is a stark contrast and one that has
major repercussions for activity rates,
migration and travel-to-work, along with
problems of road congestion and railway
timetabling between these cities and their
surrounding areas.
Precisely to understand the origins of
this important “towns versus cities” con-
trast, the article concentrates on the supply
of new employment itself, where the chart
shows substantial changes in the structure
of change. The two pairs of two-way splits
of workers in the further panels are perhaps
surprising in revealing appreciably stronger
growth of full-time than part-time working
over this period, but very little difference
between male and females, both nationally
and in terms of the pattern across the three
types of place.
As regards the first of our three ques-
tions, the answer could hardly be more
emphatic. The nine Core Cities in aggregate
increased their employment numbers at a
faster rate than Great Britain as a whole
over this five-year period and this applies
to all the worker types identified here
from the APS – self-employed as well as
employees, part-time as well as full-time
workers, and females as well as males.
Only for the BRES-derived rate is the
excess of the Core Cities over the national
change rate shown to be rather marginal,
which would seem to be at least partly due
to this measure including only some of the
self-employed. It is appreciated that self-
employment as a whole is very varied in
nature; while average income in these
small enterprises remains firmly below the
average nationally, their growth in our
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study period is spread across almost the full
range of occupations and industries.
The strong performance of the Core
Cities over this period is further underlined
by the fact that, again for the nine-cities
aggregate, their rings and the rest of their
regions display rates that, while positive
across all the measures of employment
change shown in Figure 1, are not as high
as the relevant Great Britain rate in any of
the cases. In answer to our second question,
therefore, this means that the Core Cities
were powering ahead of their surrounding
areas at this time. Additionally, it can be
seen that the rate of growth steps down pro-
gressively with distance from the cities
themselves, with the rest of their regions
beyond their rings registering the lowest
growth rate of the three types of place.
This is compatible with a view of a
strong reversal of the urban-to-rural shift
that was so dominant in the 1970s and
1980s. However, on the one hand these
data do not include the regions around
London, i.e. the East and South East
regions. On the other, the populations of
the regions that we are considering as
‘remainders’ are principally urban and con-
taining archetypal LBPs, notably North
Staffordshire, Lancashire, Tees Valley,
Humberside and the Derbyshire Coalfield.
It is therefore no surprise that, as their
geographies merge into those of the
Metropolitan Boroughs attached to Core
Cities, the difference between the two
outer types of LBP is in all cases much
smaller than the gap between these two
and the Core Cities themselves, emphasis-
ing how much the latter have powered
ahead over this period, leaving their sur-
rounding areas and their wider regions as




















9 Core Cities 9 Rings Rest of regions Great Britain
Figure 1. Employment change, 2012–2017, for the nine Core Cities and their wider regional context, by
type of worker (Source: first panel calculated from BRES data, the other seven panels from APS data. Self-
emp: self-employment).
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That is the aggregate picture across the
Core Cities combined. Moving to our third
question that concerns how much the pic-
ture varies across the nine cases individual-
ly, the answer is provided in Figure 2 in
terms of APS-based total employment.
Impressively, city dominance over their
rings and wider regions is found for seven
of the nine cases, with this embracing all
those at the heart of the major industrial
conurbations. Moreover, the difference
between the city itself and its ring is very
large in three cases (Leeds, Liverpool and
Manchester) and is marginal only in the
case of Newcastle. Indeed, the latter’s city
rate is below the national rate of 7.7%, as it
is too for the cases of Bristol and
Nottingham, whose tight boundaries may
explain why their rings appear the most
dynamic at this time. Generally, the cities’
rings have been growing more strongly than
the rest of their regions, the main exceptions
being Birmingham’s ring – principally the
Black Country, outpaced by the rest of
the West Midlands region – and
Liverpool’s ring.
Clearly, therefore, the aggregate
pattern of employment growth falling with
increasing distance from the city is by
no means universal. Indeed, it is substantial
in only three of the nine cases, namely
Manchester, Glasgow and Sheffield.
It is the very strong growth of their
rings that stand out for Bristol and
Nottingham. Apart from the latter,
though, the prevailing pattern is one of
city dominance, most notably for
Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester
and Sheffield where the cities far outstrip

















































Core City Ring Rest of region
Figure 2. Change in workplace-based total employment, 2012–2017, by Core City (Source: calculated
from APS data. Cities are arranged by Core City rate. The national comparator rate for Great Britain is
7.7%).
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In terms of differential growth by the
types of worker shown in Figure 1, a break-
down for the nine separate cases (data not
shown here) reveals a fairly common swing
back to full-time employment and a rough
parity of growth rates between males and
females. Both of these features show fairly
systematically a reversal of the post-
recession trends which were reported by
Townsend and Champion (2014) among
others. Moreover, the pattern of a regular
drop-off in rates of change away from the
cities is particularly evident in the statistics
for self-employment. The cities themselves
show stronger percentage growth than the
other types in seven of the nine cases, with
increases of a third or more in six of the
nine cases, and an average of 25.8%. In
all, this growth in the numbers of self-
employed accounted for more than a fifth
of Core Cities’ employment growth.
We contend therefore that self-
employment is rather central to the recent
economic expansion of these cities. This is
why this article moves on from our previous
practice (Champion and Townsend, 2011,
2013) of relying exclusively on BRES and
its predecessors to now defining total
employment from the APS as in
Townsend and Champion (2014 in this
journal) which allows full coverage of the
self-employed within the analysis. The
APS also affords the opportunity for
socio-economic insights including the iden-
tification of disproportionate increases in
white collar and professional employment.
Types of employment growth
What lies behind the outstanding employ-
ment growth of the Core Cities over the
past decade? Was their strong performance
compared to the national rate and those of
their rings and regional remainders due to
an increase in particular types of economic
activity or did it take place across the
board? In this section we answer this
question by reference to two key dimen-
sions of employment, namely occupational
status and industrial sector, mainly at the
broadest level of their classifications but
with more detailed sector breakdowns
where appropriate and also with some
cross-tabulation of occupation within
industry. In order to minimise the effects
of sampling error but also to concentrate
on the main features of these breakdowns,
we treat our nine cities as a single aggregate,
as also for their nine rings and the rest of
the seven regions in which they are situated.
The results for the breakdown into nine
occupational Standard Occupational
Groups (SOCs) on this basis are shown in
Figure 3. Focusing initially on the Core
Cities (the top bar in each panel), it can
be seen that it is the three highest-status
groups that have spearheaded their employ-
ment growth in relative terms, led by
Associate Professional and Technical
(SOC 3) with an increase of 22% over the
five-year period 2012–2017, followed by the
21% increase registered by Managers,
Directors and Senior Officials (SOC 1)
and 18% for the Professional group (SOC
2). These three growth rates are around
twice as high as the roughly 8–10%
recorded by next strongest groups (SOCs
5, 6 and 9, comprising skilled trades, ele-
mentary work and caring, leisure and
other service occupations). Meanwhile,
their numbers of administrative/secretarial
(SOC 4) and process/plant/machine-
operative (SOC 8) occupations grew much
more modestly and that of sales/customer-
service (SOC 7) actually contracted in this
period, albeit only marginally. With the
latter exception, it would therefore appear
that the cities’ growth was across the board
in terms of occupational groups, but
unevenly so. On the basis of the actual
numbers (not shown here), fully three-
quarters (77%) of the overall increase in
their employment was generated by the
three professional and managerial groups.
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In this achievement, the nine cities were
somewhat ahead of the national pattern,
because for Great Britain as a whole the
proportion of total employment growth
contributed by SOCs 1–3 was somewhat
lower at 72%. In fact, the cities might
have been further ahead of the national
share if they had not also performed rela-
tively strongly in most of the lower-status
occupational groups. In fact, as shown in
Figure 3 (by comparing the top and
bottom bars in each panel), it was for
only two groups of occupations – sales/cus-
tomer service and process/plant/machine-
operatives (SOCs 7 and 8) – that the city
aggregate fell short of the national rate,
these reflecting their further advance down
the path of transfering out of manufactur-
ing and physical services. For the three
highest-status occupational groups and
especially SOC 3, the cities eclipsed the
national performance to an impressive
degree.
Similarly, the way that the cities’ rings
and wider regional remainders performed
more poorly than both their cities and the
national average for total employment (as
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3 as
well as in the previous section) is replicated
for the majority of the nine occupational
groups. Amongst the three highest-status
groups, there is only one exception;
namely that their regional remainders saw
their SOC 3 grow slightly faster than the
national figure, though still well short of
the cities’ rate. Across the lower groups,
the pattern is somewhat more variable.
The main roles found here for the city
rings is that they performed relatively
strongly for three of the six groups, exceed-
ing the national rate for caring/leisure/
other-service, process/plant/machine-opera-
tive, and elementary occupations and out-
doing the cities’ rate in the first two.
The overall picture in terms of employ-
ment change by occupation over this
-5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
1 Managers, Directors and
Senior Officials 
2 Professional  




5 Skilled Trades  
6 Caring, Leisure and Other
Service  
7 Sales and Customer
Service  
8 Process, Plant and
Machine Operatives 
9 Elementary  
TOTAL





Figure 3. APS workplace-based employment change, 2012–2017, by SOC 2010: Core Cities compared
with their rings, regional remainders and Great Britain (Source: calculated from APS data).
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five-year period is thus one in which our
Core Cities appear to be in the vanguard
of the national tendency towards the stron-
ger growth of the higher-status groups.
Secondly, while there is some evidence of
growth weakening with increasing distance
from the cities, as is the case for total
employment, the main impression evident
from the nine-way grouping is of the cities
outstripping both their immediate rings and
the rest of their wider regions, this being
most notably the case for the top five occu-
pational groups. By contrast, the rings have
performed relatively strongly lower down
the skills ladder and suggest a more broadly
based resurgence from recession with a
greater reliance on more routine types of
work than the cities. Meanwhile the region-
al remainders tend to match the rings at the
higher-status end of the spectrum, but to
lag behind them (and the national rate) at
the lower end.
Turning to the other key dimension of
employment structure, Figure 4 adopts the
same format as used in Figure 3 in order to
break down employment growth by indus-
trial sector. If anything, the general dyna-
mism of the cities themselves is even more
evident here. Of the seven separate sectors
shown (which exclude the farming, fishing,
energy and water industries that account
for very few city jobs), there are only two
cases where the cities’ growth rate for 2012–
2017 does not exceed the national rate for
the sector. The manufacturing sector stands
out particularly starkly, with its net loss of
almost 8% of jobs contrasting with the
strong growth otherwise. Even for the
other sector where the cities grew at below
the national average – transport and com-
munications – they managed to achieve a
7.5% increase in jobs, while they exceeded
10% in all the others, including a rise of
almost 20% in their ‘other services’ sector.












insurance (K-N ) 
Public admin education &
health (O-Q )
Other services (R-U )





Figure 4. APS workplace-based employment change, 2012–2017, by SIC 2007: Core Cities compared with
their rings, regional remainders and Great Britain (Source: calculated from APS data).
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In three of these cases – construction, dis-
tribution/hotels/restaurants and especially
public-administration/education/health –
their growth was getting on for twice the
national rate.
Not surprisingly, this means that in most
sectors the cities grew faster over this five-
year period than their hinterlands, as also
shown in Figure 4. One exception is that of
transport and communications where the
rings grew hugely faster than either the
cities themselves or the regional remainders,
reflecting the strong growth of warehousing
and logistics ‘out of town’. There are three
cases where there is a regular reduction in
growth rate from the cities through their
rings to the rest of their regions that paral-
lels total employment change, these being
the construction, banking/finance/insur-
ance and the ‘other services’ sectors. For
the sectors labelled distribution/hotels/res-
taurants and public-administration/
education/health, however, there is no
such regular pattern, while the most distinc-
tive case is that of manufacturing, where the
reverse pattern of more positive change fur-
ther away from the cities is reminiscent of
the urban–rural shift of 30–40 years ago.
Figure 4 demonstrates the overwhelming
importance of services in the employment
resurgence of the nine Core Cities, with an
overall increase of 13.4% over the five-year
period (see the panel labelled G-U). For
further insight into their growth, this
APS-based data can be broken down into
the type of work involved, distinguishing
the self-employed and the ‘flexibly
employed’ from the main group of employ-
ees. This is done in Table 1 for the five sep-
arate service-sector components.
The relative dynamism of self-
employment in the Core Cities’ service-
sector growth is very evident from this. As
shown in the middle panel of Table 1, this
grew at a faster rate than employees in four
out of the five components, in fact by
52,000, accounting for 14.7% of the nine
cities’ total service-sector increase over the
five years. Moreover, for all five compo-
nents their self-employed numbers
increased faster than the national rate
(shown in the bottom panel), with the
strongest differential shifts being in K-N
(but this probably more in small enterprises
rather than the named groups of ‘banking,
finance, insurance etc.’ – see below for more
on this) and in R-U (the miscellaneous
group containing arts, entertainment and
recreation).
A further net gain of some 10,000 in the
Core Cities’ service-sector growth over this
period is accounted for by ‘other flexible’
people. These comprise temporary employ-
ees whose job is not permanent, not the
respondent’s intentions about that job,
and include seasonal and casual work,
fixed-term contracts and agency temping.
As Table 1 shows, they are – perhaps sur-
prisingly given the attention given them in
recent journalistic and political commen-
tary – not a major feature here, with the
major point being that growth was confined
principally just to the distribution, hotels
and restaurants (G and I) component, and
was not recorded as the main feature there.
More precise insights into the distinctive
nature of Core Cities’ service-sector
employment growth at this time can be
obtained from the more detailed sectoral
breakdowns available from the BRES,
albeit with its data including only certain
types of self-employment (see ‘Aims and
approach’ section). Table 2 highlights the
four-digit service-sector industries that
changed most in job number between 2012
and 2017, i.e. by at least 7200 jobs in either
direction, giving a total of 12 gainers and
just two losers. The table also compares the
five-year rate of growth for the nine cities
with the rates for their two types of hinter-
land and also the national rate.
What emerges from dividing up the
higher-level groups used in Figure 4 and
Table 1? As regards ‘public administration,
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education and health’ (O-Q), we find the
Core Cities benefiting from being dispro-
portionately home to two of the main
national growth industries of ‘tertiary edu-
cation’ and ‘hospital activities’. The role of
tertiary, principally university, growth in
this period will itself have generated many
service multipliers (but these overall BRES
data cannot include many student part-time
employees, being for mid-September, i.e.
before the start of the academic year). By
contrast, the analysis from which this table
is constructed also reveals that technical
colleges and general medical practice,
which are more widely distributed across
the metropolitan rings and beyond, lost
employment at around the national rate in
all types of area (data not shown here
because their total change was under
7200). At the same time, continuing from
the 2008–2009 recession, Core Cities lost
jobs in public administration itself – a sig-
nificantly worse record than our other
categories of area (see the penultimate row
in Table 2).
In the case of ‘banking, finance and
insurance etc’ (K-N), it can be seen that
the very title of this group is out of date,
this being due to internal structural change.
On the one hand, continuing the restructur-
ing initiated by the recession of 2008–2009,
the number of those working in the Core
Cities’ banks and building societies fell by
over 8000 over the five-year period, a drop
of one in eight in their staff – similar to that
elsewhere in Britain except that the cities’
rings sustained an even greater relative hit
(see the bottom row of Table 2). On the
other, we see the strong growth of four
industries classified as M, many of these
tending to be serving other firms as produc-
er and business services rather than the gen-
eral public and thus growing faster in the
Core Cities than in their surrounding areas.
Nonetheless, as shown previously in
Table 1, this sector overall diversified in
Table 1. Service-sector employment change, 2012–2017, by type of work, for nine Core Cities compared
with the rate for Great Britain.
Type of work G & I H & J K-N O-Q R & S
Change (000 s)
Total employment 69 22 86 141 32
Employees 54 19 68 129 18
Self-employment 4 6 22 9 11
Other flexible 12 4 3 4 1
Change (% for period)
Total employment 13.1 7.6 16.0 13.9 21.3
Employees 11.8 8.6 14.6 14.3 18.1
Self-employment 8.5 13.4 36.0 20.8 35.7
Other flexible 44.0 28.6 10.5 5.4 11.3
National rate (% for period)
Total employment 7.2 11.5 13.7 7.0 14.3
Employees 7.0 11.0 13.0 7.2 12.3
Self-employment 4.8 11.4 20.3 16.2 20.9
Other flexible 15.8 3.1 4.0 2.6 4.9
G & I: distribution, hotels & restaurants; H & J: transport & communication; K-N: banking, finance & insurance; O-Q:
public administration, education & health; R-U: other services.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on APS data downloaded from Nomis.
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Core Cities through a 36% growth in
self-employment (suggestive of ‘tech start-
ups’) together with growth at the national
rate of 14.6% in employees. In this case,
there was no general ‘differential shift’ in
performance compared with national rates
of change, simply strong growth due to the
Core Cities’ inherited structural advantage
in this sector.
These heads contain many of the leading
business services which expanded each by
7200 or more employees in Core Cities,
2012–2017, as shown in Table 2 – notably
activities in accountancy and law, together
with engineering, management and taxation
consultancy. Closer inspection of the table
shows that these professional groups
expanded at a higher rate in Core Cities
than they did on the national scale, while
they exert what appears to be a ‘shadow
effect’ on the metropolitan rings, which
expanded at a lower rate than the Core
Cities, and in some cases the ‘remainder of
regions’.
The ‘transport and communications’
group (H,J) provides three examples of
growth at rates greater than 50% for the
Core Cities, ranging across industries asso-
ciated with both white collar and blue collar
activities. From Table 2 we see not only the
growth of computer programming and
computer consultancy – no doubt including
tech. start-ups – at rates far above the
national average and the rates for the
other two types of area, but also warehous-
ing and storage featuring much stronger
growth for the cities than elsewhere. There
is even more of a shadow effect on
Table 2. Change in employment for the four-digit service-sector industries recording the largest job
changes for the nine Core Cities, by type of area, 2012–2017.
Industry (sector as in
Figure 4 and Table 1)















Largest gains for the cities
Restaurants (I) 22,800 29.8 23.4 20.5 24.9
Hospital activities (Q) 19,500 9.5 3.0 9.3 11.2
Tertiary education (P) 15,000 16.0 3.7 7.7 12.3
Computer consultancy (H) 13,000 55.3 28.9 33.0 35.8
Accounting, bookkeeping & auditing;
tax consultancy (M)
11,500 31.8 15.4 32.8 25.8
Engineering activities and
related consultancy (M)
10,300 35.4 27.1 20.9 20.4
Internet/ mail order retail (G) 9000 207.7 38.8 58.9 65.6
Business & other management
consultancy (M)
8300 29.2 31.9 16.7 31.9
Warehousing & storage (H) 7800 74.6 48.8 41.5 44.7
Computer programming (H) 7700 73.0 19.2 54.8 46.7
Legal activities (M) 7300 12.9 16.9 13.1 4.7
Primary education (P) 7300 9.6 1.6 1.5 2.6
Largest losses for the cities
General public administration (O) 7200 9.3 3.2 2.0 0.6
Banks & building societies (K) 8300 12.5 18.2 13.4 11.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from BRES data downloaded from Nomis.
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metropolitan rings from ‘distribution,
hotels and restaurants’ (G,I), with a high
rate of growth from internet-based retail
and mail-order activities, and faster than
national growth in Core Cities in the largest
single group of the list, restaurants, with a
higher than national share of full-timers.
This feature is supported by the growth of
‘pubs, bars and licensed clubs’, albeit this
being too small to appear in Table 2 listing.
In sum, with all but two of the Core
Cities’ 12 leading growth industries of
2012–2017 exceeding the national rate of
growth, the main generators of their
recent economic growth are broadly three-
fold. In particular, they have greatly
benefited from their very large institutional
infrastructure of universities and hospitals.
Secondly is their expanding role in the
emerging internet economy of computer
programming, consultancy and internet
sales. Thirdly, they have seen the strong
growth of professional business services
(rather than banking, building societies
and public administration), together with
supporting hospitality services.
By contrast, the cities’ rings – while
expanding their employment in all but one
of the Core Cities’ 12 main growth sectors –
fell behind the Core Cities in all but two, as
well as falling behind the national rate in
the majority of these headings. Although
there is research evidence of office decen-
tralisation in particular circumstances (as
to Manchester Airport or to the M4 strip
north of Bristol), it appears that even the
geographically closest of ‘left-behind towns’
to the Core Cities are poorly equipped with
a sectoral and professional structure to re-
assert their economic position (Industrial
Communities Alliance, 2020; Maclennan
and McCauley, 2019; Tomaney and Pike,
2018).
It is not within the scope of this article to
prescribe solutions to the problems of the
‘left-behind towns’. While the use of work-
place employment data is meant to provide
a closer approach to causation in terms of
location in economic geography, it is not
meant to exclude the great importance of
cross-boundary commuting to Core Cities
from metropolitan rings and beyond, to
be considered in relevant strategic and
transport planning. However, the issues
clearly extend far beyond this in terms of
skills training, town-centre improvement
and community regeneration in LBPs.
How far do these results reflect
international trends?
In first and second sections, the article made
international comparisons. The emphasis
on white-collar services (K-N and O-Q)
shown in the chart and tables of the last
section carries new interest, both domesti-
cally for showing the stage of dominance
which they have reached in the overall
trends of the cities of provincial Britain,
and also internationally because we find
that these trends are also well established
in other countries. It is relevant to hark
back to Gottmann (1961).
One wonders whether a new distinction
should not be introduced in all the mass
of nonproduction employment: a differen-
tiation between tertiary services – trans-
portation, trade in the simpler sense of
direct sales, maintenance, and personal
services – and a new and distinct quater-
nary family of economic activities – serv-
ices that involve transactions, analysis,
research, or decision-making, and also
education and government. (p. 576)
‘This evolution is a world-wide phenom-
enon, certainly well advanced all over the
United States and in several European
countries’ (p. 566). ONS’s sharing of an
SIC with Eurostat enables us to compare
the record of our major sectors with those
of the EU28 and its leading city regions.
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Chi-squared test scores (Townsend, 2019)
were used for each of 19 industries to deter-
mine whether there was a significant differ-
ence between the expected frequencies and
the observed frequencies by country for
2013–2018. In this case, the greatest similar-
ity across the 28 countries in rate of change
was shown by industry M, Professional and
Scientific Services, followed by P, Education,
J, Information and Communication, and Q,
Health and Social Work. That is to say, the
most expansive groups in Figure 4 and Table
2 in Britain’s Core Cities were sharing in a
reliably widespread international growth of
white collar employment.
At the EU scale, we have to make any
comparison at the scale of city regions, spe-
cifically at the level of NUTS 2 areas. In the
UK, these usually equate with former met-
ropolitan counties, like our EU cases both
including and surrounding second-order
cities; in the EU the second cities of the
seven largest other EU countries by popu-
lation (see note to Figure 5). What is most
marked, using Eurostat data throughout for
the seven combinations of sectors used in
Figure 5 and the previous tables and
charts, is that:
• Britain’s city regions exceeded the rate
of employment growth in all service
sector groups for the average of the
seven EU city regions and in the EU as
a whole;
• Remarkably Great Britain’s rates of
employment increase exceed those
of the EU in all the service sectors
and in employment as a whole,
though with the notable exception of
manufacturing.








education & health 
R-U Other services 
G-U Total Services 
TOTAL (incl A, B, D & E)
% for period
8 GB city regions
7 EU city regions
GB total
EU28 total
Figure 5. European employment change, 2012–2017, by sector, % for period (Source: Calculated from
Eurostat data for NUTS2 areas. The eight GB city regions exclude Glasgow (West Central Scotland). The
seven EU city regions are the second-largest NUTS2 areas of the EU27’s seven largest countries (by pop-
ulation): Antwerp, Hamburg, Barcelona (Catalunya), Marseille (Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur), Milan
(Lombardia), Rotterdam (Zuid Holland) and Krakow (Malopolskia)).
Townsend and Champion 581
These results are a reminder of a more
fundamental feature of the UK economy,
namely the widely commented lack of pro-
ductivity improvements since the 2008
recession in both the country and its Core
Cities (Core Cities UK, 2020), which them-
selves lie beyond the scope of this article.
Conclusion
This article has aimed at a better under-
standing of the growth spurt which
Britain’s second-order cities recorded in
the 2010s and its implications for the sur-
rounding sets of smaller cities and towns
that have collectively been labelled ‘left-
behind places’ (LBP). We have approached
this task by calculating change in workplace
employment for 2012–2017, using three-
year averages around these two dates to
minimise the effect of sample error, and dis-
aggregated the total change by type of
worker, occupational status and industrial
sector. Our primary focus has been on the
nine cities that we have examined in previ-
ous work, namely the current members of
the Core Cities Group bar its two most
recent joiners, comparing their record with
that of Great Britain as a whole and with
their hinterlands, the latter being split
between their adjacent ‘metropolitan rings’
and the rest of their regions.
Our results provide clear confirmation of
the great strides made by Britain’s second-
order cities in the 2010s indicated by other
recent observations (e.g. Beatty and
Fothergill, 2020). Given their generally
lacklustre record in previous decades
(Champion and Townsend, 2013;
Townsend and Champion, 2014), it has
been impressive to see the nine Core
Cities’ growth over the five-year study
period exceeding the national rate by a con-
siderable margin. We have found this to be
the case for all the main types of worker –
male, female, full-time, part-time, employ-
ees and especially the self-employed –
though, significantly, with declining shares
of part-time and flexible jobs in the struc-
ture of growth. All but one of our seven
Northern cities surpassed the national
rate, the exception being Newcastle.
Moreover, compared to the national aver-
age, the nine in aggregate are characterised
by particularly strong growth in the three
highest-status occupational groups, namely
managerial, professional and technical
work, and in all the broad industrial sectors
apart from manufacturing and transport. In
particular, they have benefited from being
home to universities and hospitals, plus a
wide range of business services and hospi-
tality. Also, their growth outpaced that of a
set of EU comparator city regions in all
broad sectors apart from manufacturing at
this time.
By the same token, however, the Core
Cities’ employment growth over this
period outstripped that of the areas forming
their local and regional contexts, both in
aggregate and for fully seven of the nine
cases, the exceptions being Bristol and
Nottingham. It was not that the their
‘rings’ and the rest of their regions experi-
enced a decrease in jobs (except in the one
case of Liverpool’s ring), but that this was a
period of national job growth (þ7.7% for
the five-year period) and these areas fell
short of that in all but three cases, these
being the rings of Bristol and Nottingham
and the rest of Birmingham’s region beyond
its ring. Our aggregate analyses show that
both parts of the cities’ hinterlands lagged
behind the national rate of growth for all
six types of worker that we examined. Even
in terms of our main occupational and
industrial breakdowns, there were relatively
few instances of either of these area types
significantly outperforming the national
rate: somewhat more commonly for the
rings – this for three out of the four
lowest-status occupations along with con-
struction, transport and ‘other services’ –
but for the regional remainders only for
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manufacturing. On this basis, during the
2010s the parts of the country that are
home to the majority of its ‘left-behind
places’ were generally trailing the Core
Cities in the quantity of their employment
growth and, also to a large extent, in its
quality. This suggests that the skills of the
cities’ workforces were both cause and
expression of their richness of jobs. But
we must also remember that this richness
is due not only to agglomeration providing
efficient trading links between firms, but
also to size underpinning their higher
order activities, compared with other
areas, whether in the retailing ‘hierarchy’
or the status of their hospitals and educa-
tional institutions.
Against the background of these find-
ings, what would we expect for the pros-
pects of our cities’ rings and their regional
remainders? We have found very little evi-
dence of trickle down: Table 2 shows diver-
gence of trends between cities and their
rings. In any case, normally ‘trickle down’
occurs as a national economic recovery
matures, with growth spreading out region-
ally from the South East and – to a more
limited extent – hierarchically from London
to the second-order cities, but its strength
often fades over time before diffusing to
LBPs. But even more crucially perhaps,
how sustainable is the sort of recent
growth observed for the Core Cities them-
selves, and to what extent is it the sort of
growth that could trickle down to the LBPs,
remembering that we typified the larger
ones as North Staffordshire, Lancashire,
Tees Valley, Humberside and the
Derbyshire Coalfield? The data we have
analysed do not themselves lead to clear
conclusions, but there are possibly two
lines of argument, both negative: a lot of
the Core Cities’ growth has been in the
‘quaternary’ types of economic activity
that are associated with larger agglomera-
tions; and a lot has been in low-productivity
activities, as reflected in the lack of
productivity increase in Britain’s regional
cities since the 2000s. There is a broad
policy conclusion here indicating that
LBPs cannot rely on trickle-down even in
normal times – direct interventions are
needed and on a larger scale than the
Town Deals, so as to achieve the ‘levelling
up’ promised by the Johnson government
both between and within the regions. As
part of this, there should be a push on
investment not only in transport (The
Economist, 2019) but in Further
Education, a sector that is more widely rep-
resented in LBPs than is the HE sector.
At the time of writing, however, the fore-
seeable future is dominated by the effects of
Brexit and Coronavirus. Most analyses of
Brexit expect its effects to be concentrated
on physical trade, such that economic losses
will be felt most in manufacturing areas –
and, in the case of a ‘no-deal Brexit’, par-
ticularly in the so-called ‘Red Wall’ constit-
uencies (Partington, 2020). By contrast, the
main employment effects of the pandemic
would seem to be much more nationwide,
but places specialising in sectors like oil, air
transport and vehicle and aircraft manufac-
ture are expected to be badly affected, at
least in the short term. In the medium
term, cities are seen as enjoying a good
structural position through their resilient
service industries. However, some activities
– even universities perhaps – may be subject
to redundancies. Much of the recent job
growth which we have identified is in firms
that are not as well rooted as longer-
established enterprises and also possibly in
more precarious work as self-employed or
flexible workers, even if mostly full-time. A
further threat to the cities is the partial
replacement of the pattern of office com-
muting by electronic working from home.
If this is only for part of the week (helped
by new part-time rail season tickets), it may
not even be visible in future employment
figures. Nonetheless, it is already the subject
of wide comment about the fate of city
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hospitality sectors, notably the restaurants
which headed the growth list in Table 2. A
reduction in commuting would relieve the
railways of the congestion and timetabling
problems created by the job growth we have
seen in Manchester, Birmingham and
Leeds. If much of this home working con-
tinues after the relaxation of lockdown,
then there will be some direct benefit to
the LBPs’ local spending while the Core
Cities’ hospitality and retail sectors contin-
ue to suffer. Indirectly, there is wide report-
ing (e.g. Gallagher, 2020) that more people
may find it desirable to move home out of
the major cities to the rings and wider areas
around them, if they can work from home
most of the time. Unusually, one firm
went further (Kollewe, 2020) in saying
that the pandemic has prompted a shift of
offices themselves: ‘It’s a pivot into the sub-
urbs and the rings around London,
Birmingham and Manchester’. This is a
useful reminder that the growth of
Britain’s Core Cities has fluctuated consid-
erably over the last 20 years, while a wide-
spread revival of Midlands and Northern
regions can only be viewed as tentative.
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